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I.

INTRODUCTION

In his essay The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions,1 Don Langevoort
accurately describes the state-of-play in a somewhat broken system of corporate governance
in the context of business combinations (a.k.a. mergers and acquisitions or, as referenced
here, “M&A”). The law (in both its regulatory and enforcement forms), as described by
Professor Langevoort, fails to effectively curb observed behavioral biases in the M&A
transactional environment. As a result, Professor Langevoort ultimately urges that law
practice—rather than legal principles and constraints arising from legislation, regulation, and
judicial review—holds the answer to important unresolved questions at the intersection of
behavioral economics and corporate governance. Specifically, he contends that:
corporate law is about more than strategies of judicial or regulatory
intervention. The practice of corporate law and corporate governance—in
which lawyers are centrally involved—requires a great deal of psychological
as well as economic astuteness, and the rich body of behavioral M&A
research can and should inform how deals are negotiated, structured and
approved, even in setting of minimal judicial review.2
He goes on to say that:
[t]he most important message . . . applies to those individuals trying to
manage the deal process in the shareholders‟ best interest. Those
individuals, including the lawyers, bankers, and accountants, should
recognize the pressures driving members of the deal team and be
demanding and critical, even when they genuinely believe in doing the deal.3
Finally, consistent with the foregoing, he concludes that:
the greatest use for this [behavioral] research is mainly for participants in
the transactional process itself, who very much need to better understand
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not only that human nature poses a risk to the deal, but how, why, and
under what circumstances there is reason to worry.4
Some may find Professor Langevoort‟s conclusions in this regard obvious because
legislative and regulatory rulemaking and judicial intervention have, indeed, proven
unworkable, seemingly leaving only practical solutions on the table. Others may find them
counterintuitive in that flaws of human nature exist in both M&A dealmakers and those
responsible for M&A practice, making it difficult for us to fathom how one may
meaningfully check the behavioral biases of the other. Both views may be valid critiques of
the conclusions he draws in his essay. So be it. But neither takes away from the simple
elegance (and, I believe, validity) of his idea. Professor Langevoort‟s description of legal and
practical considerations in M&A transactions is accurate, and his solution rings true to me as
a former M&A practitioner. A major question exists, however, as to whether his idea is
practicable. I maintain that it is and hope, through this response to his essay, to demonstrate
that promising practical tactics exist to achieve his strategic objectives.
Professor Langevoort encourages us to educate transactional participants about
both the nature of observed behavioral norms that impact M&A transactions and the effects
of the observed norms on those transactions so that transactional participants may engage in
activities that reinforce desirable behavioral norms and counteract undesirable norms. I
stand ready to join in this effort and the overall charge toward practice-based responses to
behavioral critiques of corporate governance in the M&A context.
Accordingly, as a means of further effectuating the educational mission suggested
and commenced by Professor Langevoort in his essay, this paper expresses preliminary
thoughts on one potential component of the practice-based answer Professor Langevoort
seeks. Specifically, this paper asserts that fairness opinions, nearly ubiquitous in M&A
transactions, can be better used in the M&A transactional process to mitigate or foreclose
the negative effects of prevalent adverse behavioral norms. Like Professor Langevoort‟s
conclusions excerpted above, the idea that fairness opinions may offer opportunities to
neutralize behavioral norms in M&A transactions is both obvious (because fairness opinions
are designed to serve a gatekeeping function, protecting both sellers and buyers against
biased or otherwise inaccurate management price determinations) and counterintuitive (in
that the investment bankers who typically author fairness opinions, and the corporate
managers who retain them, have been accused of acting in accordance with behavioral biases
in rendering and accepting those opinions). The core idea motivating this paper is that
fairness opinions, when properly constructed and used, have the potential to provide
effective gatekeeping in spite of the operation of countervailing behavioral biases.
Accordingly, this paper begins by briefly reviewing the nature (attributes, benefits
and detriments), regulation, and utilization of fairness opinions in the M&A transactional
process, including the ways in which fairness opinions manifest, support, and attempt to
counteract behavioral norms. Next, the paper suggests best practices in the construction
and use of fairness opinions that take into account our knowledge of behavioral psychology
as it relates to M&A transactions. The net effect of these best practices is to transform what
may be unconscious behavioral norms into conscious biases that, once exposed, can be
confronted and, as desired, mitigated. The paper ends with a summary conclusion.
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FAIRNESS OPINIONS IN M&A PRACTICE

Fairness opinions typically are provided to corporate management by an outside
financial advisor, such as an investment bank or valuation firm,5 to provide assurance that
the pricing of a transaction is fair—specifically, that the transaction is fair “from a financial
point of view.”6 In M&A transactions, these opinions may be provided to the board of
directors or a committee of the board of directors for the acquiror or the target or both,
depending on the context. Fairness opinions tend to have a particular, predictable structure
and form.7
When used as part of management‟s deliberative process, fairness opinions have the
capacity to increase the amount of information available to executives and the board of
directors, especially independent directors.8 The price verification provided by fairness
opinions may be critical where a market-based price is unavailable or unreliable.9 In
addition, fairness opinions represent a way for officers and directors to ensure compliance
with their fiduciary duties of care (informing themselves of all material information
reasonably available) and loyalty (including good faith) in M&A transactional decisionmaking. Fairness opinions are not legally mandated, but since the Delaware Supreme
Court‟s 1985 decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom (in which a target‟s board of directors was
criticized for, among other things, its perfunctory assessment of the pricing of a merger in
the absence of a fairness opinion),10 they have become omnipresent in M&A transactions of
For ease of reference, I will often refer to the authors of fairness opinions as investment banks, although I
acknowledge that valuation firms and other financial advisors also may render fairness opinions. I note here,
however, that the range of services provided by investment banks may make them more likely to have a
conflicting interest than more narrowly tailored financial services firms. See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text.
5

See ROBERT F. REILLY & ROBERT P. SCHWEIHS, HANDBOOK OF ADVANCED BUSINESS VALUATION 310 (2000)
(“A fairness opinion is a letter, prepared by a knowledgeable financial advisory firm (generally an investment
banking firm or an entity specializing in valuations), that states whether or not a transaction—or the
consideration or financial terms of a transaction—is fair. Fairness is assessed from a financial point of view.”);
Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2006) (“A fairness opinion is an opinion
provided by an outside advisor, usually, though not necessarily, an investment bank, that a transaction meets a
threshold level of fairness from a financial perspective.”). The concept of fairness from a financial point of view
is imprecise and is not defined in the opinions themselves. See Steven J. Cleveland, An Economic and Behavioral
Analysis of Investment Bankers When Delivering Fairness Opinions, 58 ALA. L. REV. 299, 336 (2006); Michael B. Rizik, Jr.
& Matthew M. Wirgau, Fairness Opinions: No Longer a Laughing Matter, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 233, 239 (2008).
The clear importance of the “financial point of view” qualifier is to limit the scope of the opinion to matters
within the expertise of the firm rendering the opinion. See REILLY & SCHWEIHS, supra.
6

7

See Rizik & Wirgau, supra note 6, at 251-56.

See generally Matthew D. Cain & David J. Denis, Do Fairness Opinion Valuations Contain Useful Information? (Am.
Fin. Ass‟n 2008 Meetings, Working Paper, Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=971069 (finding
evidence that fairness opinions provide information useful to directors and investors). See also Cleveland, supra
note 6, at 300-01 (explaining in simple terms the information-enhancing role of a fairness opinion in corporate
transactions); Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1589 (“[A]n unconflicted valuation conducted with rigor and discipline in
accordance with current academic precepts and without biased manipulation of subjective inputs can materially
inform as to value.”); Melissa B. Frye & Weishen Wang, Boards, Uncertainty, and the Use of Fairness Opinions, 18
CORP. GOV.: AN INT‟L REV. 49 (2010) (showing, among other things, that boards with more independent
directors may seek fairness opinions to enhance their knowledge).
8

Jeffrey B. Bede, Are Fairness Opinions . . . Fair?, CHESSIECAP, at 3, http://www.chessiecap.com/pdfs/FairnessOpinions.pdf (last visited March 21, 2011).
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a certain size.11
A secondary function of fairness opinions is to provide shareholders with
transaction pricing information, enabling them to better determine how to exercise rights to
tender or vote (or dissent and exercise statutory appraisal rights, if available).12 The opinions
are disclosed and described as part of the publicly available materials for certain public
company tender offers and for mergers and sales of all or substantially all of a corporation‟s
assets.13 Some empirical evidence suggests that the existence of a fairness opinion in an
M&A transaction protects the shareholders of acquiror firms by keeping the premium over
market prices relatively low.14 Target fairness opinions may be more important than
acquiror fairness opinions in this regard. A recent study indicates that voting shareholders of
an acquiror value the fairness opinion rendered by the target‟s advisor (which typically is less
biased) more than the fairness opinion of the acquiror‟s advisor in making their voting
decisions.15
As a general matter, fairness opinions are designed to ensure that there are effective
procedural checks on potential managerial and institutional deviations from normative
wealth maximization. If, as Professor Langevoort‟s essay suggests, individual cognitive traits
or biases threaten to impair rational individual and institutional decision-making in M&A
transactions and neither regulation nor the courts provides fully effective checks on the
potential for irrational behavior, then a third-party opinion from a reliable source seems like
a sensible response. This is a weighty responsibility for the firms that write fairness opinions
because they serve as reputational intermediaries.15 Both management and shareholders may

11

Professor Frank Partnoy makes this point particularly well:
[T]he directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom did not follow the then relatively common practice of
soliciting a fairness opinion from an investment bank. The court in Van Gorkom suggested
that although such fairness opinions were not required by law, the directors would have
obtained some advantage in the case if they had obtained a fairness opinion. Thus, Van
Gorkom created a regulatory entitlement related to fairness opinions.

Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491,
523 (2001) (footnote omitted).
See Bede, supra note 9, at 3 (“[T]he fairness opinion serves an important role in providing useful information to
shareholders….”).
12

See PETER A. HUNT, STRUCTURING MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE
338 (4th ed. 2009) (“In transactions that require shareholder approval, the fairness opinion is often included in
the proxy statement or prospectus that is sent to shareholders seeking their vote in favor of the deal”). Securities
and Exchange Commission disclosure rules may mandate disclosure. See, e.g., Sec‟s & Exch. Comm‟n, Reg. M-A,
Reports, Opinions, Appraisals and Negotiations, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1015 (2010) (requiring disclosure of the
existence of and certain information about fairness opinions); Sec‟s & Exch. Comm‟n, Reg. M-A, Exhibits, 17
C.F.R. § 229.1016 (2010) (requiring that fairness opinions disclosed under Item 1015 be included as exhibits).
Interestingly, cash tender offers that do not constitute going-private transactions do not invoke these
requirements. See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1590.
13

See, e.g., Darren J. Kisgen et al., Are Fairness Opinions Fair? The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions, 91 J. FIN. ECON.
179 (2009).
14

See SERGEI PARIJS, FAIRNESS OPINIONS AND LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FAIRNESS 88-89
(2005) (classifying those who offer fairness opinions as “gatekeepers” and stating that “gatekeepers are also called
„reputational intermediaries‟”); Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional
Curiosities, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 95, 100 (2007) (describing the theory explaining reputational intermediaries and
citing to investment banker roles in corporate transactions as an example); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure
and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308-09 (2004) (discussing gatekeepers
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view the perceived stature of these firms and their willingness to render an opinion as a seal
of approval on the transaction on which the opinion is given.16
But the proposition that fairness opinions could be important, independent,
practice-based checks on biased decision-making by officers and directors in M&A
transactions flies in the face of a substantial body of academic literature questioning the
actual role and value of fairness opinions in M&A transactions. The critiques are many and
varied.17 For example, empirical evidence indicates that acquirors using fairness opinions
underperform in the short term.18 Acquiror fairness opinions may have a tendency to overvalue the target.19 In addition, fairness opinions have been described as subjective,
indeterminate, and inconsistent in approach and in the weighting of valuation factors; they
are not always rendered in accordance with the best practices advocated in practical and
academic literature.20 Knowledgeable non-scholarly commentary is consistent with these
findings.21 Overall, questions remain as to whether the benefits of fairness opinions are
outweighed by their high cost.22
Perhaps the critique with the most traction relates to the possible effect of
conflicting interests on the quality of a fairness opinion. The potential conflicts range from
those arising from a lack of independence (given that many of the authors of fairness
opinions are financial advisors to the firm in connection with the transaction for which the
opinion is written and also have provided and plan to continue providing other financial
advisory services to the firm) combined with an overall compensation scheme for the
transaction in the form of a sizable success fee (based on the aggregate transaction value) to
the existence of actual or possible business interests on both sides of the M&A transaction.23
The capacity for divided loyalties in this environment seems great. Yet, there is some
as reputational intermediaries and listing investment bankers as among those gatekeepers who serve as
reputational intermediaries).
I am not, of course, the first to make this observation. See, e.g., Rizik & Wirgau, supra note 6, at 237 (“A
fairness opinion is the issuer's „Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval‟ for the constituency seeking it.”).
16

See Yasuhiro Ohta & Kenton K. Yee, The Fairness Opinion Puzzle: Board Incentives, Information Asymmetry, and
Bidding Strategy, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 229, 232-33 (2008) (describing three bases for bias in the rendering of fairness
opinions).
17

See Kisgen et al., supra note 14, at 180-81; Lucy Huajing Chen & Heibatollah Sami, Does the Use of Fairness
Opinions Impair the Acquirers‟ Abnormal Returns? The Litigation Risk Effect 4 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, available at http://www.af.polyu.edu.hk/jcae_af/paper2008/concurrent/S.2a%20Sami.pdf).
18

See Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 17 (“[T]he valuations of acquirer advisors exceed those of matched target
advisors by 29%, on average.”).
19

Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1573-85. To the subjectivity point, one industry professional aptly describes fairness
opinions as involving “both art and science.” Bede, supra note 9, at 2.
20

See, e.g., ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 374 (2010) (“A fairness opinion is
usually touted as an independent, unconflicted seal of approval for a deal. But on Wall Street, they are often seen
as little more than paid rubber stamps.”).
21

See Barnett, supra note 15, at 146 (“[E]ven routinely employed certification practices may convey little new
information to contracting parties, thereby doing nothing more on a net social basis than imposing a costly „drag‟
on market transactions.”).
22

See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1586-88; see also Fairness Opinions and Advisor Independence, AM. APPRAISAL, 2 (Winter
2010),
http://www.american-appraisal.us/userfiles/file/Fairness%20opinions%203222010.pdf
(describing
potential conflicts of interest for financial advisors).
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dispute about whether conflicts of interest have actual detrimental effects on fairness
opinions.24 Regardless, research confirms that shareholders may discount the value of
fairness opinions because they know the advisors rendering the opinions are conflicted.25
Even assuming the potential or actual existence of conflicts of interest in some
situations, the benefits of fairness opinions may exceed their costs. For example, asking for
a valuation from a financial advisor who is familiar with the firm may provide some
offsetting benefits, e.g., in the form of a more accurate valuation.26 Advisors with preexisting relationships with a firm should have more information about the firm, enabling a
more accurate (and, potentially, more efficient) valuation. In addition, certain authors of
fairness opinions may be more accurate than others. For example, support exists for the
contention that fairness opinions authored by top-tier financial advisors signal a higher
quality transaction.27
In 2007, in an effort to address the conflict of interest issue, the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) imposed new requirements on member firms that render
fairness opinions.28 These requirements, embodied in FINRA Rule 5150 (originally
proposed as NASD Rule 2290), comprise disclosure obligations relating to both the member
firm rendering the fairness opinion and the opinion itself (operative only when “the member
issuing the fairness opinion knows or has reason to know that the fairness opinion will be
provided or described to the company's public shareholders”) and mandate that any member
Compare Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 4 (“We conclude, therefore, that there is little evidence that fairness
opinion valuations are driven by conflicts of interest.”) with Kisgen et al., supra note 14, at 181 (“We find . . .
evidence that conflicts of interest . . . affect the objectivity and quality of F[airness] O[pinion]s.”). Specifically,
the Cain and Denis paper finds “no evidence . . . that opinion providers provide less accurate valuations for
mergers in which they are paid contingent fees” and “no evidence that unaffiliated third-party investment banks
provide valuations that are more accurate than affiliated advisors.” Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 4. Kisgen et
al., on the other hand, “find that acquirers with F[airness] O[pinion] providers that also receive a fee contingent
on deal completion have significantly lower announcement-period returns” and that in cases involving financial
opinion advisors “otherwise unaffiliated with the transaction . . . the market does not react negatively to the use of
these advisors.” Kisgen et al., supra note 14, at 181.
24

Anil K. Makhija & Rajesh P. Narayanan, Fairness Opinions in Mergers and Acquisitions 4 (Fisher Coll. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 2007-03-108; Charles A. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2007-11, 2007), available at
http://www.terry.uga.edu/finance/docs/narayanan_fairness_opinions.pdf (“Shareholders, aware of the conflict
of interest facing the advisor, thus rationally discount their valuation of the deal when the advisors provide the
fairness opinions.”).
25

See Cain & Denis, supra note 8, at 4 (“advisors with a pre-established relationship with the target” “produce
significantly lower absolute valuation errors”).
26

The results . . . provide some evidence that both acquirer and target advisors produce
significantly lower absolute valuation errors for transactions in which they have had previous
business experience with either the target only or both the acquirer and target. This evidence
supports the view that prior business relationships produce information that is useful in the
producing more precise fairness opinion valuations.
Id. at 22.
See Kisgen, supra note 14, at 181 (“The use of top-tier F[airness] O[pinion] advisors on the acquirer side
reduces the deal premium, while the use of lower-tier FO advisors is associated with a higher probability of
completing the deal, higher premiums paid, and significantly lower announcement returns.”); Cain & Denis, supra
note 8, at 4 (“We further find that top-tier investment banks produce significantly lower absolute valuation
errors.”).
27

FINRA R. 5150, Fairness Opinions, FINRA Manual,
/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6832.
28
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firm rendering the opinion have written procedures regarding the approval of fairness
opinions.29 The required disclosures, some of which were formerly voluntary or included
only in the text of public filings describing the opinion, must be included in the fairness
opinion itself.30 Admittedly, these new requirements fall short of ensuring the efficacy of
fairness opinions that may be tainted by a conflict of interest.31 Mandatory disclosure may
be a necessary yet insufficient response to self-interest,32 and weak process regulation is
similarly unlikely to have much effect.33
Finally, even if the critiques regarding fairness opinions can be overcome or
substantially offset by their positive attributes, it is important to note that investment
bankers authoring fairness opinions may be subject to the same cognitive biases—the risk
and loss aversion, overconfidence, availability, and self-serving biases—that operate on
corporate officers and directors.34 Other biases also may impact the behavior of investment
banks rendering fairness opinions.35 The existence of these biases may have effects on the
ability of a fairness opinion author to resist the tug of self-interest or to properly assess the
reputational risk associated with delivering a “low-quality opinion.”36 Learning, competition,
monitoring, and other activities and structures may counteract these individual behavioral
tendencies, but one still must account for the possibility that cognitive biases impact fairness
opinion decision-making at the institutional, as well as individual, level (Professor
Langevoort‟s third of the four tall steps that must be climbed to incorporate insights from
psychology into corporate and securities law) in establishing any remedial measures.37
In sum, fairness opinions have an entrenched place in the M&A process that makes
them well positioned to mitigate the effects of cognitive biases on decision-makers.
However, as currently constituted and regulated, fairness opinions fail to live up to their
potential. They may have certain predictable and unpredictable inaccuracies resulting from
the norms of fairness opinion practice, conflicting interests, and processing errors. In other
words, fairness opinions, as a possible check and balance on flawed decision-making in the
M&A process, exhibit some of the same defects Langevoort and others observe in the M&A
decision-making context generally. Yet, there may be ways to enhance the prospect that

29

Id.

30

See Rizik, Jr. & Wirgau, supra note 6, at 262.

31

Id. at 265.

See Langevoort, supra note 1, at 67 (“[C]orporate and securities law‟s favorite strategy—more disclosure—often
fails when up against a well-ingrained, institutionally favored behavioral bias.”).
32

See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1595-98 (citation omitted) (commenting on the proposed NASD Rule 2290, later
codified as FINRA Rule 5150, and concluding that “[t]he rule in its current proposed form is largely uneventful
and a disappointment given the NASD acknowledgement of the issues before it.”).
33

34

See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 324 (citations omitted).

See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (describing dependent gatekeepers, characterizing fairness opinion
authors as dependent gatekeepers, and identifying biases to which dependent gatekeepers likely are subject).
35

Cleveland, supra note 6, at 326 (describing how “[t]he cognitive bias regarding loss aversion may lead a bank or
a banker to deliver to a long-term client an opinion with content pleasing to the client—even if the opinion is of
low quality—to preserve the relationship with that client” and that the overconfidence, availability, and selfserving biases “may lessen the disciplinary effect of reputation”).
36

37

Id. at 330-34; Langevoort, supra note 1, at 66-67.
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fairness opinions could have a meaningful role in diminishing the effects of behavioral biases
on M&A decision-making. The remainder of this paper is dedicated to that proposition.

III.

ADDING VALUE TO FAIRNESS OPINIONS AS A RESPONSE TO
BEHAVIORAL BIASES

It remains for us to determine how to mold this rather promising, yet flawed,
device—the fairness opinion—into a tool that can be used more effectively to curb cognitive
biases in the M&A decision-making process. I posit that a multi-pronged attack on existing
fairness opinion practice may yield results in this regard. Two main avenues exist for
reforming the use of fairness opinions in the M&A process: (1) modifications can be made
to the form of fairness opinions and the process that creates them or (2) adjustments can be
made to the way that fairness opinions are employed and reviewed in the M&A decisionmaking process. A number of scholars have addressed the first of these two avenues for
reform, but not many have approached the latter. This Part preliminarily outlines a series of
proposed changes in the contents, construction, use, and assessment of fairness opinions
that, when taken together, hold promise to enhance the value of fairness opinions as a
response to cognitive bias in the M&A context.
A. Further Changes to the Form of Fairness Opinions
As earlier noted,38 FINRA Rule 5150 imposes content requirements on fairness
opinions written by member firms.39 However, it represents a somewhat limited approach,
catered only to specific aspects of the potential for conflicting interests (and not cognitive
bias). Why not, then, consider a similar approach to counteracting bias? That is precisely
what Professor James Fanto suggested ten years ago.
The SEC might consider a disclosure rule that would hold investment
bankers to a higher standard in their opinions by requiring them to consider
the potential negative consequences and costs arising from the transaction
and to quantify the likely negative results of the merger. In the same vein,
investment bankers could be required to give an opinion that explicitly
addresses the rationality of the deal from both the acquirer's and target's
perspective as opposed to their current limited focus on the fairness of the
exchange ratio. After all, since they are so involved in promoting the megamergers, it is appropriate for them to be enlisted in the effort to achieve a
comprehensive rationality on the part of boards and shareholders. In
addition, by expanding their opinions to address the evidence on the
negative results of mega-mergers, investment bankers would enhance the
comprehensive rationality of merger decision-making. They would also
present a stronger scientific rationale than that contained in the watereddown, self-interested version of financial economics currently used to
justify their fairness opinions.40

38

See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.

FINRA R. 5150, Fairness Opinion, FINRA
/en/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6832.
39

Manual,

available

at

http://finra.complinet.com

James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1333, 1398 (2001) (footnote omitted).
40
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In his 2001 article, Professor Fanto offers this content-based proposal as one
among a number of reforms targeted to combat behavioral bias in M&A decision-making.41
As Professor Langevoort notes in his essay, it is Professor Fanto who demonstrated many
years ago, in the study presented in that article, that psychological factors impair rationality in
M&A decision-making.42 Professor Fanto‟s proposal is nicely tailored to the biases he and
Professor Langevoort observe, and I endorse it. I would suggest that in the current
regulatory environment, however, FINRA, rather than (or perhaps in addition to) the SEC,
may be the appropriate author of the rule and that, in fact, the requirements proposed by
Professor Fanto be added to FINRA Rule 5150. In this regard, consideration should be
given to counteracting bias in fairness opinions rendered by both investment bankers and
others in both public and private transactions.
B. Changes in the Way Fairness Opinions are Made
Changing the form of fairness opinions will necessarily involve modifications in the
process used to construct those opinions. To support the content-based changes proposed
by Professor Fanto and increase the overall accuracy of fairness opinions in combating
cognitive bias in M&A decision-making, what might a good process look like? Best practices
used in other professions in rendering opinions may provide useful guidance.
Various other reputational intermediaries (gatekeepers)43 issue opinions in
connection with business transactions, including principally lawyers and accountants.
Lawyers are not subject to externally imposed restrictions on the form and content of their
opinions (although custom and practice guidance provide important, yet nonbinding,
parameters and regulatory authorities, including the SEC, and stock exchanges may require
the coverage of specified items in specific transactional circumstances),44 and the effect of a
legal opinion on the M&A decision-making process is negligible.45 Auditors, on the other
hand, must comply with significant rules that dictate the form and substance of their audit
opinions,46 and their opinions carry great weight in M&A decision-making.47 Before the
41

Id.

42

Langevoort, supra note 1, at 68.

43

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

Jonathan C. Lipson, Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary
Investigation), 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 59, 71 (2005) (“Although closing opinion letters are not generally regulated,
they have become fairly standardized in forms that are widely available.”). Practice conventions are important to
legal opinion practice. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Comment, Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and Third-Party
Opinions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 59, 62 (2005) (referencing bar association activities relating to the form of third-party
legal opinions and opinion committee practice).
44

See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Limits of Lawyering: Legal Opinions in Structured Finance, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (2005)
(“[C]lients generally have more and better information about the consequences of a transaction, other than the
transaction's legality. The clients therefore are better positioned to make business decisions.”). Professor
Schwarcz also writes:
45

[N]either third-party legal opinions nor legal opinions addressed to clients purport to
evaluate a transaction's inherent business wisdom. At least heretofore, an opining lawyer has
had no duty to evaluate the business merits of the underlying transaction beyond the
obvious ethical and legal obligations of not knowingly furthering a fraudulent transaction.
Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted). Undoubtedly, however, because they are conditions to closing transactions
(including M&A transactions), legal opinions facilitate completion of the transaction. Id. at 28.
See id. at 20. Professor Schwarcz succinctly describes those rules: “[T]he criteria for fair presentation of a
company's financial condition and results of operations are already dictated by generally accepted accounting
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advent of FINRA Rule 5150, the opinion process for investment banks rendering fairness
opinions looked much like that for lawyers issuing legal opinions. Perhaps the audit process
is a better model for fairness opinion practice.
A 2006 article written by Professor Arthur Laby supports this notion.48 In his
article, Professor Laby divides the world of gatekeepers into two categories: dependent and
independent.49 Under Laby‟s taxonomy, investment banks authoring fairness opinions (like
lawyers issuing legal opinions) historically would have been classified as dependent
gatekeepers—reputational intermediaries that “provide advice and recommendations to
assist a client in meeting its goals.”50 Dependent gatekeepers are distinguishable from
independent gatekeepers (which generally include auditors) by their fiduciary duties, which
bind them to their clients through trust and confidence.51 Professor Laby observes that
gatekeepers are subject to unconscious bias in performing their roles (although he does not
focus on the M&A context and does not discuss fairness opinions).52
A dependent gatekeeper is accountable to its client and knows what the client
wants.53 As a result, the advice of dependent gatekeepers tends to be directional, and
dependent gatekeepers tend to be committed to a particular outcome that is beneficial for
the client.54
People generally are motivated to seek approval from their audience and are
biased in favor of conclusions that conform to the audience's views. When
the views of the audience are known to the decision maker before she
forms an opinion, she will redirect her opinion to conform to them.
Directional goals take over. People adopt positions that are likely to be
pleasing to those to whom they are accountable.55
This approach decreases accuracy in the gatekeeper‟s decision-making. “[A]fter committing
to a decision, if called upon to justify the choice, people are highly motivated to avoid selfcriticism and justify their original decision.”56 Moreover, “[d]ependent gatekeepers are likely

principles (GAAP). GAAP comprises a set of standards for financial accounting and reporting, officially
recognized as authoritative by the SEC, that provide the „credibility, transparency, and comparability‟ needed for
"the efficient functioning of the economy." Id. (footnotes omitted).
See Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989, 991 (2003) (“[A]uditors act as
gatekeepers. Certain major transactions involving potentially large information asymmetries cannot get off the
ground without audit opinions, either as a matter of business necessity or of law.”).
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Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119 (2006).
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Id. at 122.
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Id. at 127.
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Id. at 124-26 & 128-32 (comparing and contrasting the attributes and roles of auditors and lawyers).
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Id. at 135-40. See also Cleveland, supra note 6, at 324-30.
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Laby, supra note 48, at 142.
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Id. at 144.
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Id. at 141.

Id. at 143-44. “Psychologists refer to this as retrospective rationality or defensive bolstering.” Id. at 144 (footnotes
omitted).
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to be more prone to bias through anchoring and adjustment than independent
gatekeepers.”57
Conversely, independent gatekeepers are principally accountable to a greater public
outside of the client—an audience the gatekeeper does not know.58 “When the audience's
views are unknown, conformity is not possible and accuracy goals predominate. In that
case, opinion authors are more likely to consider multiple objectives and engage in a more
thoughtful, deliberate, self-critical analysis.”59 Independent gatekeepers are committed to
processes rather than outcomes.60 “Process accountability . . . leads to a better decision
making process, such as more consideration of alternatives and less self-justification.”61
It is important to acknowledge that even independent gatekeepers may not be able
to maintain complete independence from their clients in performing their work. Certain
scholars, for example, question the ability of auditors to be truly independent.
How realistic is the assumption that auditors—even those of high
integrity—can provide impartial judgments that respond to the interests of
creditors, stockholders, and the general public, rather than to the interests
of the companies that hire them? Psychological research points to an
inescapable conclusion: such impartiality is impossible . . . .62
Specifically, auditors manifest a self-serving bias that is enhanced by, among other things, the
faceless, “statistical,” nature of the shareholders their opinions serve.63 As a result, auditors
may have an interest (conscious or subconscious) in adopting positions that are favorable to
their clients in a manner similar to the interest (even if not the obligation) of lawyers,
especially given the fact that auditors are paid by clients—not by the government, third
parties, shareholders, or the general public—for the audits they perform.64
Nevertheless, Professor Laby does describe an important structural difference
between the type of gatekeeping performed by dependent gatekeepers (like lawyers), on the
one hand, and independent gatekeepers (for example, auditors), on the other. The disparate
fiduciary duties that Professor Laby identifies appear to be the key factor. A lawyer, as a
57

Id. at 146.

58

Id. at 142.
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Id. at 141 (footnote omitted).

60

See id.

61

Id. at 146 (footnote omitted).

Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38 SLOAN MGT. REV. 89, 90 (1997). See also Sean
M. O‟Connor, Be Careful What You Wish for: How Accountants and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence,
45 B.C. L. REV 741, 820-21 (2004) (noting the capacity of consulting engagements and other non-accounting
work to detract from auditor independence); Sean M. O‟Connor, The Inevitability of Enron and the Impossibility of
“Auditor Independence” under the Current Audit System (Mar. 1, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=303181
(“[T]he accounting firms are supposed to be „independent‟ of the audit client and act on behalf of the public, not
the audit client. The problem is that, however well this audit system worked at its inception, it is fundamentally
flawed now, such that as a practical matter it is impossible for auditors to be „independent‟ of their audit
clients.”); Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1597, 1637-53 (2000) (summarizing scholarly studies and commentary relating to accountant and auditor
independence).
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See Bazerman et al., supra note 62, at 91-92.
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See O‟Connor, supra note 62, at 2-3; Prentice, supra note 62, at 1629-37.
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dependent gatekeeper, has a duty of loyalty to his or her client and an obligation to represent
the client zealously.65 An auditor, as an independent gatekeeper,
performs a different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively
depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a
public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the
client. The independent public accountant performing this special function
owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as
well as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands
that the accountant maintain total independence from the client at all times
and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.66
Surely, these distinct operative client duties are meaningful; they clearly belie different
gatekeeping roles. The differences in these roles may not be adequately considered and
weighed in corporate decision-making (including M&A negotiations and deliberations).
While the opinions of neither a dependent nor an independent gatekeeper are free from
inaccuracies, the broad-based loyalties and process orientation of independent gatekeepers
seemingly have a greater propensity to create accurate opinions.
How do investment banks issuing fairness opinions fit into Professor Laby‟s system
of categorization in light of FINRA Rule 5150? Do they continue to be classified most
accurately as dependent gatekeepers? There has been and is some dispute as to whether an
investment bank issuing a fairness opinion does or should owe a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of its client.67 It may nevertheless owe a fiduciary duty to its client. 68
Moreover, FINRA Rule 5150 may be interpreted to reflect the existence of or create a duty
of trust that is fiduciary in nature. The investment bank knows what its client wants and is
committed to an outcome that gives the client what it wants. In other words, there is a
commitment to finding that the subject transaction is fair from a financial point of view in
order to facilitate consummation of that transaction. Thus, despite the advent of FINRA
Rule 5150, the investment bank that renders a fairness opinion still appears to be more of a
dependent gatekeeper, as categorized by Professor Laby.
The observations made by Professor Laby in his article indicate that it may be
possible to enhance the accuracy of fairness opinions by making investment banks more
accountable to shareholders, an audience the banker does not know (as opposed to the
65

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010); id. at R. 1.7.
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United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-818 (1984).

Compare Baker v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 656 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236-37 (D. Mass. 2009) (finding “that special
circumstances existed to create a fiduciary relationship apart from the terms of the contract”) with Joyce v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 F.3d 797, 800-03 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding no fiduciary duty owed to shareholders by
an investment bank issuing a fairness opinion). See also CIBC Bank & Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Credit
Lyonnais, 270 A.D.2d 138 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2000) (finding no fiduciary duty to investors where the
terms of the contracts between the parties “flatly contradicted” the exitence of one); Fulco v. Cont‟l Cablevision,
Inc., No. 89-1342 S, 1990 WL 120689, at *3 (D. Mass. June 19, 1990) (indicating that an investment bank did not
owe a fiduciary duty to a selling corporation‟s shareholders); PARIJS, supra note 15, at 153-57 (describing legal
actions involving fiduciary duty claims by shareholders against investment banks issuing fairness opinions); Park
McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46
EMORY L.J. 163, 192 n.40 (1997).
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See Bear Stearns & Co. v. Daisy Sys. Corp. (In re Daisy Sys. Corp.), 97 F.3d 1171, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996);
Fulco, 1990 WL 120689, at *4; M. Breen Haire, Comment: The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Investment Bankers in
Change-of-Control Transactions: In Re Daisy Systems Corp., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1999).
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client‟s board of directors), and by better insuring that the investment banks rendering
fairness opinions are committed to processes rather than outcomes.69 Under current law,
given the lack of a clear duty of investment banks to shareholders and the absence of a direct
contractual relationship between the investment bank and the shareholders, “the exact scope
of an investment bank's liability to stockholders for the rendering of an „incorrect‟ fairness
opinion is still uncertain and subject to much judicial and academic debate.”70 Some have
proposed that investment banks that issue faulty fairness opinions be held strictly liable for
inaccuracies in their fairness opinions.71 While this approach does make fairness opinion
authors accountable to shareholders, it would result in increased transaction costs to cover
the increased risk of litigation and may encourage investment banks to be committed to
conservative outcomes. Liability for negligence may create fewer perverse incentives and
better align accountability of investment banks in fairness opinion practice with the liability
of accountants in audit practice.72 In general, the idea would be to refrain from treating
effects on shareholders as externalities and to implement practices that take investment
banks further away from being dependent, directional, outcome-committed reputational
intermediaries. The goal would be to mitigate undesirable biases and increase information
quality in fairness opinions by fostering independence through accountability to shareholders
and process commitment.
C. Changes in the Way Fairness Opinions are Used and Assessed
Finally, a comprehensive resolution to issues associated with bias in M&A decisionmaking also should focus on how to improve the process relating to the boards of directors‟
use and assessment of fairness opinions in M&A transactions. Boards of directors should be
both “demanding and critical” in their review of fairness opinions.73 This focus may be
difficult to implement, however, since it means changing the way the board of directors does
business—and doing that pervasively. But, as Professor Langevoort suggests, lawyers and
accountants can help.74 A board of directors, under the guidance of its advisors, can
institute better overall cultural norms and provide a more rigorous analysis of the fairness
opinion and the materials supporting that opinion. Professor Davidoff offers a statement of
best practices in this regard.
A fairness opinion delivered orally or in writing by the preparer at a board
meeting is almost always, at least in a corporate control transaction,
accompanied by a “board book.” The board book details the underlying
analyses conducted by the opiner to arrive at and conclude financial
fairness. It is here that the meat of the investment banker‟s work lies. A
well-advised board will review this book in connection with their [sic]
receipt of a fairness opinion and question the bankers as to their derivation
69

See supra notes 48-61 and accompanying text.
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See Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1568 n.38.
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See PARIJS, supra note 15, at 88.

See C. Richard Baker & Deborah Prentice, The Evolution of Auditor Liability Under Common Law, 8 J. FORENSIC
ACCT. 183 (2007); Jay M. Feinman, Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 17 (2003); J. Keaton Grubbs & Jack R. Ethridge, Jr., Auditor Negligence Liability to Third Parties
Revisited, 10 J. LEGAL, ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 75 (2007).
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of fairness. It is in these actual analyses that the meaning and worth, if any,
of a fairness opinion lies.75
In order for a board of directors to ascertain methodically the “meaning and
worth”76 of a fairness opinion, legal and other advisors to the board of directors should
develop and evolve a useful set of questions for assessing the accuracy and integrity of
fairness opinions. Because fairness opinions are expert opinions, I suggest that an
appropriate model for these questions derives from a checklist of five basic questions
assembled and recommended by one of my colleagues for use by judges in evaluating the
admission of expert testimony in proving lost profits—a situation in which similar biases
may operate on the opinion author.77 In a 2007 article,78 Professor Bob Lloyd offered the
following questions as a nonexclusive list for use by judges in that context:






Is the expert qualified for this analysis?
How reliable is the underlying data?
Are the expert's assumptions supported by the record?
Does the expert deal adequately with facts inconsistent with the expert's theory?
Has the expert considered alternative scenarios?79

These inquiries are consistent with the intents and purposes of FINRA Rule 5150 (which
focuses on disclosure and process), Professor Fanto‟s proposed disclosure rule, and a reframing of fairness opinion authors as independent gatekeepers. Moreover, the answers to
these questions should help “participants in the transactional process . . . to better
understand . . . how, why, and under what circumstances there is reason to worry.”80
1. Expert Qualifications
In asking the first of the five questions, boards of directors should look for evidence
of specialized skills that may be applicable to the transaction and valuation methodology at
issue. Although the overall qualifications of an investment bank rendering a fairness opinion
generally are not an issue (since valuation is a general skill in the toolkit of financial advisors),
certain types of valuation—particularly asset-based valuation techniques—may benefit from
more focused expertise. It is important that boards of directors assess the type and relative
size of the transaction, as well as the types of valuation methods used by the author of the
opinion, to determine whether the substance of all or part of the fairness opinion extends
beyond the author‟s areas of expertise and to meaningfully question that expertise in light of
the amount of money at issue.
75

Davidoff, supra note 6, at 1568-69 (footnotes omitted).
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Id. at 1569 (footnote omitted).

See Prentice, supra note 62, at 1625-27 (describing the operation of the self-serving bias in this context).
Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV. 909, 940-47 (2000) (discussing
compensation-related bias in expert witness testimony).
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Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits After Daubert: Five Questions Every Court Should Ask Before Admitting Expert
Testimony, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 379 (2007).
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Id. at 380.
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Where the amount at stake is relatively small, it is not fair to require a party
to conduct a nationwide search to find the individual best qualified to opine
on the particular issue, especially when there may be several distinct areas . .
. that might call for different areas of expertise and thus require different
experts. On the other hand, where there are tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars at stake and the party clearly has the resources to find and hire the
people best qualified to testify, a court should not accept less. The fact that
counsel chose someone not among the top people in the field should lead
the court to suspect that the better-qualified experts would have given lessfavorable testimony.81
Ideally and typically, boards of directors would make this assessment before engaging a firm
to render a fairness opinion for an M&A transaction. It would behoove the board to revisit
the issue, however, at the time the opinion is rendered and being considered by the board.
2. Data Reliability
The second question, regarding the reliability of the data underlying the fairness
opinion, enables the board of directors to explore where the factual information supporting
the opinion came from. Did the client provide the information? Which personnel of the
client participated in the gathering, distillation, and synthesis of the data needed? How
knowledgeable is each about the data that was supplied? Was any of the data independently
verified by an audit or other similar means of certification that could be obtained costeffectively? Is the “data . . . „of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field‟”?82 Members of the board of directors could use the answers to these questions to
assess the integrity (completeness and accuracy) of, and potential for bias in, the data used to
generate the opinion. The board of directors may want to arrange to interview the personnel
involved in assembling and generating the applicable data or to otherwise test its accuracy
and completeness.
3. Support for Assumptions
Additionally, the board of directors should inquire whether the assumptions the
fairness opinion authors make are fair based on the underlying data and other facts. Fairness
opinion assumptions not founded in fact may mislead the board of directors.83 In addition,
“testimony that relies on multiple assumptions should be viewed with extreme skepticism.
Where one estimate is piled on another, the uncertainty is magnified . . . .”84 The board of
directors must be careful, however, to assess the relative importance of different
assumptions to the opinion before condemning an opinion due to faulty assumptions.
[U]nsupported assumptions should not be fatal if the assumptions were not
necessary to the expert's testimony or if the effect of their not being correct
would not have had a major impact. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants has dealt with the question of assumptions in the
context of auditors' reports on financial statements: “[T]he attention
81

Lloyd, supra note 78, at 391 (footnotes omitted).
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Id. at 391-92 (footnote omitted).

Cf. id. at 399-400 (describing the need to exclude expert testimony based on faulty assumptions because of its
propensity to mislead).
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Id. at 409.
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devoted to the appropriateness of a particular assumption should be
commensurate with the likely relative impact of that assumption on the
prospective results. Assumptions with greater impact should receive more
attention than those with less impact.”85
Through this process of testing and weighing assumptions, the board of directors can better
understand and assess the overall validity of the fairness opinion.
4. Treatment of Inconsistent Facts
The fourth question asks the board of directors to challenge the opinion giver‟s
analytical integrity. “Where there are facts inconsistent with the expert's theory or model,
the expert cannot just ignore them. Sometimes the expert will be able to make a reasonable
argument that the contrary data is wrong or that it does not apply to the question he or she
is addressing.”86 But where the investment bank or valuation firm cannot either identify or
explain data inconsistent with its valuation analysis or opinion or where it hides or
inappropriately discounts inconsistent data, the board of directors should be skeptical of the
opinion‟s accuracy and overall integrity.
5. Consideration of Alternatives
Directors can learn a lot about a fairness opinion by inquiring about what is not in
the opinion. Thus, the fifth question focuses on the investment bank‟s consideration of
alternative scenarios. There are many different ways to ask about “the road not taken.”87
Which valuation methods were considered and not used? Why were they excluded? What
data and assumptions were considered and then discarded in the valuation and opinion
drafting process? What happens to the analysis reflected in the opinion when certain
assumptions are relaxed or altered? The content of these questions on alternatives
necessarily overlaps with that in preceding questions, but it provides necessary completeness
and closure to the board‟s analysis of the fairness opinion author and the opinion itself. If
the board of directors is empowered with alternatives, then it can better assess, for example,
whether the assumptions the fairness opinion author made are fair.88 Moreover, exploring
alternative scenarios “alleviates the false impression of certainty”89 that a fairness opinion
may give, revealing the true nature of the opinion as “both art and science.”90 A firm
rendering a fairness opinion may, however, offer only the alternative scenarios that bolster

85

Id. (footnote omitted).
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Id. at 410-11 (footnote omitted).

This is an obvious, shameless reference to the famous poem of the same name. ROBERT FROST, The Road
Not Taken, in MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9, 9 (1916). For those who may not have read this literary work recently, in
the poem, the traveler comes to a fork in the road and stops to take a long look down one path before taking the
other. See id.
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Cf. Lloyd, supra note 78, at 421-22 (“[W]hen the assumptions underlying the more extreme scenarios have been
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its original opinion. So, it is important not to rely on this singular line of inquiry when
assessing the accuracy and integrity of the opinion.91

IV.

CONCLUSION

In his essay, Professor Langevoort presents a convincing picture of the many roles
that cognitive biases play in M&A decision-making. As he notes, scholars have written
precious little on behavioral finance in this context; they—we—could and should do more
theoretical and empirical work on the effect of bias on individual and institutional decisionmaking in the M&A context. Additional empirical work especially should add meaningful
information and analysis to the existing story that Professor Langevoort tells. Yet, even in
the absence of further scholarly work to support Professor Langevoort‟s conclusions, his
observations about behavioral biases in M&A practice and the difficulty in applying
behavioral psychology in this context make important scholarly contributions to behavioral
and corporate finance.
However, in assessing the fourth tall step in his quest to plausibly apply behavioral
science to M&A decision-making—i.e., determining appropriate interventions to address the
possibility of non-rational decision-making—Professor Langevoort makes another
significant contribution. He suggests that we turn to elements of practice and process and to
the actions of transaction participants to supplement an existing legal and regulatory system
that offers an inadequate response to observed biases in M&A decision-making. This paper
picks up that thread running through Professor Langevoort‟s essay and begins exploring the
potential for individual and team (as well as, potentially, organizational) learning curves
described by Professor Eric Sundstrom in his responsive paper92 by suggesting that fairness
opinion practice, a part of almost every public company M&A transaction, can be reformed
to better respond to the cognitive biases that plague M&A.
Specifically, this paper suggests that changes in the contents, construction, use, and
assessment of fairness opinions may better enable fairness opinions to counteract the
potential and actual biases of corporate management and shareholders in M&A decisionmaking. This is, avowedly, a very limited thesis; changes to fairness opinions and related
practices are not sufficient in and of themselves to implement Professor Langevoort‟s vision.
Rather, the changes to fairness opinion practice set forth here represent only one possible
approach among many potential practice-oriented interventions. One might say that it is an
incremental step toward full achievement of the fourth tall step described in Professor
Langevoort‟s essay.
In concluding his 2001 article on behavioral psychology and M&A decision-making,
Professor Fanto stated the following about his own ideas for modifying M&A decisionmaking:
With more detailed empirical research, the reform proposals should make
board members focus on negative consequences of the transaction and
should stimulate more debate in the board room. Board members will then
be more likely to address better the influence of specific psychological
Cf. Lloyd, supra note 78, at 422 (“Presenting alternative scenarios is of course no cure-all. . . . Experts can still
present several extreme scenarios, giving the least outrageous of them an appearance of plausibility by labeling it
the „conservative‟ scenario.”).
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factors. Moreover, much legal improvement may naturally result if those
who make legal decisions become more aware of the influences of
psychological and behavioral factors on merger decision-making.93
Although I cannot speak for Professor Langevoort, in my view, this is the essence
of what we (he, together with Professor Sundstrom and me) are building toward in our
papers. I hope that others will add to these ideas as time advances and enable us to finish
climbing Professor Langevoort‟s fourth tall step.
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Fanto, supra note 40, at 1401.

